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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States and other technologically advanced countries,
individuals, businesses, and governments have come to depend on the
Internet. Daily reports of attacks, accidental data leaks, and service
disruptions suggest that the proper functioning of the Internet is not
something to take for granted. Trustworthiness-a concept that
encompasses not only security but also safety, survivability and other
properties that guarantee expected behavior-is becoming a prominent
research and public policy objective.
Internet trustworthiness is hardly the only objective of Internet policy,
and setting the terms under which new applications and content sources can
reach Internet users has become a focus of much recent debate. Scholars
and policymakers have cast this debate in terms of network neutrality,
which holds that network providers may not block, degrade, or otherwise
discriminate against applications or content sources. A permissive
regulatory environment might allow such discrimination, and the lack of
competition in last mile broadband connections might well make it
profitable.
What are the implications of a network neutrality rule for
trustworthiness (and vice versa)? Scholars and policymakers have thus far
[Vol. 61
TR USTWORTHINESS AS LIMITATION
given only superficial answers to this question or avoided it entirely,
concentrating instead on whether a network neutrality rule would help or
hurt innovation on the Internet. Network neutrality opponents argue that
improved security is one type of innovation that might follow from not
imposing a network neutrality rule, but this position ignores the technical
and economic issues that make improving trustworthiness a hard problem.'
Proponents, on the other hand, concede that network security is crucial
enough to warrant making exceptions to a network neutrality rule.
Allowing network providers to deviate from neutrality only to the extent
necessary to protect network trustworthiness is rooted in judicial and
regulatory decisions and administrative rules that helped establish the
principle of nondiscrimination as the core of network neutrality. This
doctrine of trustworthiness-by-exception stretches back over fifty years and
developed around the telephone network. Whether this doctrine is suitable
for the technical and institutional complexity of the Internet is unclear, and
network neutrality proponents have not made the case that it applies.
We argue in this Article that using trustworthiness as a limitation on
network providers' nondiscrimination obligations is basically sound and
that the set of trustworthiness mechanisms network operators may deploy
depends heavily on the exact language of the (proposed) exception.2 Some
existing proposals would likely thwart valuable trustworthiness
mechanisms, while others could allow network providers to use
trustworthiness as a pretext to discriminate while doing little to improve
trustworthiness. Still, there is a middle ground that accommodates both
neutrality and trustworthiness.
This Article is structured in three parts. Part I defines trustworthiness
and shows that it has served as a limitation on network operators'
nondiscrimination obligations throughout the development of network
competition policy and scholarship. Reviewing current proposals for
network neutrality rules, we show that advocates of network neutrality
recognize the need to provide a trustworthiness exception to any neutrality
obligation, but they differ in their prescriptions for the scope of this
exception. We find three categories of exceptions: broad, medium, and
narrow. Part II examines whether several plausible types of trustworthiness
improvements would be permissible under these exceptions. We argue that
the narrow trustworthiness exception prevents service providers from
1. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1,
9 (2005).
2. To be clear, we are not arguing for or against imposing a network neutrality rule on
broadband network providers. Our view is that if Congress, the FCC, or some other
authority imposes such a rule, it should allow network providers to take steps-including
discriminating against certain kinds of traffic, applications, or protocols--to protect the
trustworthiness of the network.
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implementing trustworthiness improvements that are likely to be important
in future networks; but the broad exception effectively swallows a
neutrality rule. The medium exception avoids both of these problems. Still,
getting the formal language of the exception right is only part of what is
necessary in order to establish a balance between neutrality and
trustworthiness. Part III suggests that a trustworthiness exception provides
some means to make ongoing assessments of whether network operators
are using the exception appropriately. We propose the trustworthiness
exception be conditioned on network providers' disclosure of
trustworthiness-related discrimination.
II. TRACING TRUSTWORTHINESS THROUGH THE NETWORK
NEUTRALITY DEBATE
A. Defining Trustworthiness
A trustworthy system has been described as one that "does what
people expect it to do-and not something else--despite environmental
disruption, human user and operator errors, and attacks by hostile parties."3
Trustworthiness is a "multidimensional" concept encompassing
"correctness, reliability, security ... privacy, safety, and survivability. 'A
Security, in turn, means resistance to attacks that "can compromise the
secrecy, integrity, or availability of data and services."5
Where the Internet is concerned, trustworthiness is important for a
number of reasons. Computer networks have become elements of our
nation's infrastructures. Other highly developed nations are following suit.
Network-based attacks, which can last for days, could have major effects
on a national economy. For example, in May 2007, Estonia suffered a
distributed denial of service attack that brought banking and other services
to a halt for several days. Vulnerabilities in a network can also lead to
leaks of personal information, potentially leading to a loss of privacy,
personal financial losses, and revelations about candidates that might well
alter the outcome of national elections.
To view network neutrality through the lens of network
trustworthiness, concrete examples of trustworthiness properties will be
helpful. By focusing on properties, and hence what must be guaranteed, we
3. CoMm. ON INFO. SYS. TRUSTWORTHINESS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRUST IN
CYBERSPACE 13 (ed. Fred B. Schneider) (1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.
php?recordid=6161; see also Majory S. Blumenthal, The Politics and Policies of
Enhancing Trustworthiness for Information Systems, 4 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 513 (1999).
4. COMM. ON INFO. SYS. TRUSTWORTHINESS, supra note 3, at 14.
5. Id.
6. See John Schwartz, When Computers Attack, N.Y. Tm4ES, June 24, 2007, at WK1.
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avoid limiting the discussion to the known, specific attacks of today.
Attacks coevolve along with defenses, but trustworthiness properties one
might expect from a network are independent of threats and the attacks
they might employ.
To start, we refine a model typically used to describe relationships on
the Internet. When considering trustworthiness, it is important to recognize
that individual end-users are not the only consumers of data services that
networks carry; the subnets comprising the Internet also exchange traffic
with one another. These interconnections depend on peering and transport
agreements, whose significance will become evident in Part II.
With a network's customer base expanded to include subnets (as well
as individual users and computers), we can list examples of network
properties that are useful for building trustworthy networked information
systems. For each property, we discuss the extent to which the current
Internet architecture provides support.
1. Confidentiality
A sender might want a guarantee that any data she sends is not
intercepted or stored and then later accessed by unauthorized third parties.
Such unauthorized access can be prevented by encrypting data, and the
current Internet protocols allow this because they do not distinguish
between encrypted and unencrypted data.7
2. Communications Privacy
In addition to preventing third parties from gaining access to the
contents of a communication, a user might wish to prevent others from
learning about the very existence of a communication. Guarding against
disclosure of this kind of information involves limiting the dissemination of
traffic logs and restricting access to packets in transit. Currently, network
operators alone decide whether to keep logs of the traffic they carry; the
Internet architecture does not provide users with a means to direct a
network provider not to log traffic.
3. Integrity
One of the Internet's core networking protocols, the Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP), implements a guarantee that data accepted by a
7. In practice, the strength of any guarantee against a confidentiality breach depends
on other factors: the strength of the encryption algorithm, the sender's and recipient's key
management practices, the trustworthiness of any certificate authority involved, and whether
the encrypted data are dumped and decrypted offiine. These factors are related to
cryptography rather than network design. The point is that the current Internet need not be
changed to handle encrypted traffic.
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receiver have not been corrupted while in transit. Each TCP header
contains a field for a checksum, which is (more or less) a unique numerical
coding of the bit strings comprising the header and data in a TCP packet.8
A receiver independently calculates the checksum of incoming data and
compares it to the checksum that is carried in the packet. A difference in
these two checksums indicates that the data were corrupted in transit and
causes the receiver to discard the packet. The sender would then retransmit
that packet. Thus, packets not discarded are identical on the sending and
receiving ends of a communication.
4. Availability
The current Internet architecture offers only limited guarantees
concerning availability. Specifically, the Internet architecture provides
guarantees that users who persist for long enough in attempting to
communicate will be able to do so, aided (in part) by the multiplicity of
routes that packets may take from sender to recipient. TCP enforces the
availability guarantee by requiring the sender to repeatedly retransmit a
packet until an acknowledgment packet has been returned by the receiving
computer.9 However, this particular delivery guarantee does not imply that
packet delivery is timely, and TCP delivers data on a best-effort, first-in-
first-out basis. Network providers can therefore shape (i.e., delete or delay)
traffic based on source, destination, and application type. Traffic-shaping
decisions lie with network providers, so they are beyond the control of
most users.
Outages, such as those caused by earthquakes or accidental severing
of network cables, might cause traffic to take suboptimal routes and leave
destinations unreachable, but the Internet's current routing architecture
keeps other hosts usable during such outages. Though network design
might help to mitigate some environmental threats, it is unlikely to defend
against all of them.
Though the current Internet's availability guarantees are celebrated,
the constant exposure of Internet-connected systems to attacks has led
some to contemplate making future networks support a guarantee against
receiving traffic from certain hosts, which we deem a guarantee of
isolation.'0 (The Internet does not provide such a guarantee.) We discuss in
Part Im how such a guarantee would relate to network neutrality.
8. See W. RICHARD STEVENS, 1 UNIX NETWORK PROGRAMMING, NETWORK APIs:
SOCKETS AND XTI 671-72 (2d ed., 1998).
9. Id. at 33.
10. David Clark calls the isolation guarantee that we describe in the main text a
"negative availability" guarantee. See David D. Clark, Requirements for a Future
Internet: Security as a Case Study 7 (Dec. 3, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://find.isi.edu/presentation-files/David-Clark-Security-Requirements-2.pdf). Clark uses
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5. Correctness
The Internet currently employs the domain name system (DNS) for
translating between names that are easy to use and remember, such as
www.whitehouse.gov, and the numerical IP addresses actually used for
routing packets. The DNS is vulnerable to a variety of attacks that
undermine network trustworthiness. For example, by compromising the
DNS, attackers can redirect users' packets to malicious sites. The malicious
host might then impersonate the legitimate host, allowing attackers to
collect usernames and passwords. This form of attack facilitates identity
theft and the fraudulent use of personal information to commit financial
crimes." The Internet itself (or its successors) may provide facilities for
higher-level queries, such as the search engine queries that have become
many users' primary means of navigating the Internet, as well as queries
that allow programs to find services. 2 Compromises to these services could
severely harm the trustworthiness of those networks.
The rest of this Part traces the role of trustworthiness in the
development of network neutrality. We start with Hush-a-Phone3 and
Carterfone,14 two cases that helped form the nondiscrimination norm that is
central to the network neutrality principle.' 5 In particular, we demonstrate
that trustworthiness served as a limiting principle on the nondiscrimination
principle defined in this line of cases and regulations. That is, telephone
network operators are generally forbidden from discriminating against
content, devices, and applications except when discrimination is necessary
this turn of phrase to portray a guarantee to not receive traffic as the opposite of the
Internet's "positive availability" guarantee to a party sending a packet-that the packet will
be delivered. We find the term "isolation" more descriptive and use the term in our Article.
11. For more details about attacks on DNS, see SEC. Assocs. INST., ATTACKING THE
DNS PROTOCOL- SECURITY PAPER (2003), available at http://www.rootsecure.net/cont
ent/downloads/pdf/sans attackingdns_protocol.pdf.
12. The DNS-based attack discussed in the main text is but one illustration of the
security problems that arise from the difficulty of authenticating (i.e., "establishing the truth
of some claim of identity") the sender (or receiver) of a message on the Internet. COMm. ON
IMPROVING CYBERSECutITY RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
TOWARD A SAFER AND MORE SECURE CYBERSPACE 113-14 (Seymour E. Goodman & Herbert
S. Lin eds., 2007), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record id=11925 (follow
"full text" hyperlink). Consequently, developing stronger and more widely used
authentication mechanisms is one approach under discussion to address a large number of
Internet security ills. See id. at 3-5.
13. Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
14. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, Decision, 13
F.C.C.2d 420, 13 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 597 (1968) [hereinafter Carterone].
15. See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 141, 142 (2003) ("The link between anti-discrimination regulations and
network innovation are as old as the Hush-a-Phone and Carterfone decisions, which
controlled AT&T's efforts to destroy innovative network attachments." (internal citations
omitted)).
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to protect the trustworthiness of the network. We then show how
policymakers and scholars imported this structure into proposed network
neutrality rules, limiting the nondiscrimination obligation with an exception
that applies when a network operator discriminates to protect
trustworthiness.
B. Trustworthiness as a Limitation on Nondiscrimination in
Common Carrier Regulations
A basic conception of trustworthiness emerged as a limiting principle
in the judicial cornerstone of network competition policy, the D.C.
Circuit's 1956 decision in Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States.'6 Hush-a-
Phone sold a telephone receiver attachment that reduced background noise
present at the speaker's location and also prevented the speaker's voice
from being heard by others in close proximity. AT&T and the Bell
companies sought to ban use of the Hush-a-Phone device under a rule that
forbade the "attachment to the telephone of any device not furnished by the
telephone company.',' 7 At the end of a lengthy proceeding to hear Hush-a-
Phone's complaint against AT&T's application of this "foreign
attachment" rule, the FCC found that the lower volume and distorted sound
of a Hush-a-Phone user's voice effected a "public detriment" to the phone
system and, on this ground, upheld the Hush-a-Phone ban.' 8 The Hush-a-
Phone court, however, found that the FCC's own findings did not support
its conclusion and ordered the Commission to reverse the ban of Hush-a-
Phone devices.' 9 In doing so, the D.C. Circuit announced a broader
principle, which forms part of the intellectual foundation of network
competition policy: the device prohibition was an "unwarranted
interference with the telephone subscriber's right reasonably to use his
telephone in ways which are privately beneficial without being publicly
detrimental." 20 The court did not specify what a "public detriment" might
be, but it clearly recognized the possibility that one user's attaching the
wrong type of device to the phone network, or using a device in the wrong
way, could degrade or disrupt phone service for others. That is, new
devices must not threaten the trustworthiness of the phone system as a
whole. The device at issue in Hush-a-Phone did not pose such a threat.
Nevertheless, preserving the trustworthiness of the phone network was
integral to the Hush-a-Phone principle.
16. 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
17. Id. at 267 (internal quotation omitted).
18. Id. at 267-68.
19. Id. at269.
20. Id.; see also Carterfone, supra note 14, at 423-24 (referring to the statement in the
main text as "the principle of Hush-A-Phone").
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More than a decade later, the FCC considered whether the Carterfone
device, which allowed a mobile radio user to connect to a party on the
phone network, had a "material adverse effect upon use of the telephone
system" when deciding whether to prohibit it.2 ' The FCC found that a
device that provided "nonharmful interconnection" of a telephone system
user to a user off the grid did not prevent AT&T from "carry[ing] out its
system responsibilities," including maintaining a reliable phone system.
22
The Carterfone court prohibited AT&T from discriminating against a
device-AT&T had approved its own interconnection device-unless the
device caused harm to the telephone network. In other words, AT&T could
not ban a potential competitor's device while offering a device that posed
the same risks to trustworthiness; if it wished to ban a device that
threatened trustworthiness, it had to ban all similar devices.
The nondiscrimination rule announced in Carterfone was broad but
not unlimited. The court explicitly stated that it was "not holding that the
telephone companies may not prevent the use of devices which actually
cause harm, or that they may not set up reasonable standards to be met by
interconnection devices. 23 The court also emphasized that AT&T
"remain[ed] free to make improvements to the telephone system" and to
revise standards for interconnection devices accordingly.24 Furthermore, in
the wake of Carterfone, the FCC issued rules that established a testing and
certification process for devices manufactured to connect to the telephone
system, to ensure that they would not harm the network.25 Thus, Carterfone
did not leave network providers powerless to ban devices that harm
network trustworthiness. Instead, Carterfone provided a limited
trustworthiness exception to telephone network providers' general
nondiscrimination obligations.
The FCC followed the Hush-a-Phone principle when computer
connections to the phone network became common. In the Second
Computer Inquiry, the FCC again affirmed Hush-a-Phone's and
21. Carterfone, supra note 14, at 423. AT&T argued in the Carterfone proceeding that
allowing the device to connect to AT&T's network would "divide the responsibility for
assuring that each part of the system is able to function effectively"--a duty that AT&T
asserted it should be solely responsible for bearing. Id. at 424.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. These "Part 68" rules are codified in 47 C.F.R. pt. 68 (2008). Of particular interest
here is the definition of "harm" that is provided in these rules: "Electrical hazards to the
personnel of providers of wireline telecommunications, damage to the equipment of
providers of wireline telecommunications, malfunction of the billing equipment of providers
of wireline telecommunications, and degradation of service to persons other than the user of
the subject terminal equipment, his calling or called party." 47 C.F.R. § 68.3 (2008).
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Carterfone's articulation of a "consumer right[]" to use the network "in
ways [that] are privately beneficial without being publicly detrimental. 26
More recently, as the FCC and federal courts have removed
broadband service providers from common carrier regulations that applied
to the telephone system, the Commission has begun to revisit the
relationship between network access and network trustworthiness.27 In the
midst of these regulatory shifts, former FCC Chairman Michael Powell
articulated four "Internet Freedoms," which include the freedom to use
applications and attach devices of users' choices.28 Consistent with prior
network access regulations, Chairman Powell bounded some of these
freedoms with trustworthiness considerations. Specifically, "Freedom to
Access" was subject to network providers' "legitimate needs to manage
their networks," and the "Freedom to Use Applications" was subject to the
qualification that they "will not disrupt the network., 29 In 2005, the FCC
adopted a policy statement on network neutrality that articulated four
principles similar to the four Internet Freedoms. 30 The most significant
difference, for the purposes of this Article, is that the policy statement
26. See Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules & Regs. (Second
Computer Inquiry), Order, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, para. 142 (1980) (citing Hush-a-Phone and
Carterfone).
27. Much of the complicated history of these developments is recounted in National
Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967
(2005), which held that broadband service delivered via cable modem is an "information
service," and hence not subject to the common carrier regulations that apply to a
"telecommunications service." Id. at 974-80 (describing the history of FCC regulations
concerning access to communications as well as the particular proceeding that led to Brand
X); id. at 985-1000 (explaining the Court's decision to uphold the FCC's classification of
cable modem services). Shortly after Brand X was decided, the FCC classified broadband
Internet service delivered via DSL as an information service. See Appropriate Framework
for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order and Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853 (Sept. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Wireline Order].
For a brief history of all of these proceedings, see JOHN WINDHAUSEN, JR., GOOD FENCES
MAKE BAD BROADBAND: PRESERVING AN OPEN INTERNET THROUGH NET NEUTRALiTY 8-12,
2006 (Public Knowledge White Paper), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/
pk-net-neutrality-summary-20060206.pdf.
28. Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for the
Industry, 3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 5, 11-12 (2004) (listing the four "Internet
Freedoms" as (1) Freedom to Access Content; (2) Freedom to Use Applications; (3)
Freedom to Attach Personal Devices; and (4) Freedom to Obtain Service Plan Information).
29. Id. at 11.
30. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.RI 14986, para. 4 (2005) [hereinafter Policy
Statement]. In the current Congress, a proposal to fund additional wireless and broadband
deployment would make grants available to network operators provided that they adhere to
the principles in this FCC policy statement. See H.R. 1, 111 th Cong. § 6002(e)(2)(E) (2009).
This bill would also require grant recipients to "operate basic and advanced broadband
service networks on an open access basis," with "open access" to be defined by the FCC
within 45 days of the enactment of the bill. Id. § 6002(e)(2)(C), (0(6).
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describes a broader trustworthiness qualification to the freedom to attach:
the statement would include devices "that do not harm the network,"
whereas Chairman Powell would have prohibited only devices that enable
theft of service.31
Though the FCC has used trustworthiness in a simple and consistent
way, it has not articulated in detail how to distinguish a genuinely trust-
related instance of discrimination from a spurious one. This elaboration
might not have been necessary in the past; when the FCC complied with
Hush-a-Phone, it might have been plausible to think of a single entity as
owning a communications network and defending it against threats arising
from the ends of that network. By the time Chairman Powell described the
"Internet Freedoms," however, the diversity of network ownership, the
extent of network interconnections, the diversity of devices connected to
networks, and the ability of attacks to cross from one provider's network to
another have made the notion of providers managing "their" networks
somewhat simplistic.
C. Trustworthiness as a Limitation in Network Neutrality Rules
Legal scholars and policymakers have applied trustworthiness-by-
exception, essentially without modification, to proposed network neutrality
rules. Their proposals contemplate that network operators will discriminate
against traffic exchanged with other providers' networks to protect
trustworthiness, but their proposals differ significantly in scope.
Proposals from legal scholars avoided spelling out which
trustworthiness threats warrant deviation from network neutrality, and
avoided enumerating what mechanisms are permissible to defend against
these threats. The most detailed scholarly proposal was offered by
Professor Tim Wu, a leading proponent of network neutrality. He
recognized the challenge that protecting network trustworthiness poses to
neutrality: "Spam, viruses, junk mail and telemarketing are different names
for problems that every information network faces. What this suggests is
that network security must be taken seriously, but also cannot become a
blanket answer to any scrutiny of carrier practices. 32 Wu advanced a
model network neutrality statute that would make discrimination
permissible to "limit[] ... the distribution of computer viruses, worms, and
... denial-of-service or other attacks., 33 This proposal, however, does not
31. Compare Policy Statement, supra note 30, at para. 4 with Powell, supra note 28, at
12.
32. Tim Wu, Wireless Net Neutrality: Cellular Carterfone and Consumer Choice in
Mobile Broadband 27 (New Am. Found. Wireless Future Program, Working Paper No. 17),
available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/WorkingPaperl7_WirelessNetNeutrality_
Wu.pdf.
33. Wu, Network Neutrality, supra note 15, at 167.
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analyze specific network defenses, nor does it offer any guidance for
ensuring that network operators do not use the exception to discriminate for
reasons other than trustworthiness.34 Other scholars, less solicitous of
trustworthiness, handled the neutrality-trustworthiness interface even more
vaguely3 5 or have offered fewer details about the contours of a
36trustworthiness exception.
To get a better sense of how a trustworthiness exception might work,
we turn to network neutrality legislation that has been introduced in
Congress in recent years." The proposals can be grouped according to the
breadth of the exceptions they allow: narrow, broad, and medium. For the
remainder of this article, we use the term "trustworthiness exceptions" to
refer specifically to these three classes. By "breadth," we refer to
conditions under which an exception would allow a network operator to
34. Wu offers only a broad principle: "[A]bsent evidence of harm to the local network
or the interests of other users, broadband carriers should not discriminate in how they treat
traffic on their broadband network on the basis of inter-network criteria." Id. at 168.
35. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and
the Economics of an Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS
383 (2007); Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REv. 917, 1011 (2005) (stating that network neutrality might
prohibit placing "security and spain regulation measures" at the Internet's core-even if
efficient and effective-and that "this ... may be one significant cost of sustaining an
infrastructure commons").
36. See WINDHAUSEN, supra note 27, at 44 (stating that a network neutrality rule should
allow a network operator to "block[] spam, viruses, or threats to national or network
security").
37. A network neutrality mandate remains a live issue in Congress. See Policy
Statement, supra note 30. Though we do not specifically analyze this most recent bill, the
policy questions we raise and the analytical framework we develop apply to it with equal
force. Congressional forbearance from imposing a nondiscrimination obligation would
likely leave service providers with broad power to block or degrade communications for
security purposes without regard to their source or contents. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 1, at
9,22, 31, 71.
In the absence of a Congressional network neutrality mandate, the regulatory levers
that would remain to address discrimination by service providers include conditions on
telecommunications provider mergers and FCC rulemakings. For discussions of the
possibility of FCC intervention outside of the merger context, see Wireline Order, supra
note 27, at para. 102 (reserving possibility that the FCC will use Title I ancillary jurisdiction
to regulate broadband Internet access); Posting of Harold Feld to Wetmachine,
http://www.wetmachine.com/totsf/item/333 (Aug. 5, 2005, 12:55 EST). In the merger
context, the FCC imposed a condition of "maintain[ing] a neutral network and neutral
routing" on the merger of AT&T and BellSouth, effective for 30 months after closing. See
Ex Parte Communication of AT&T Services, Inc. at 8, Review of AT&T Inc. and BellSouth
Corp Application For Consent to Transfer of Control, WC Docket No. 06-74 (rel. Dec. 28,
2006), reprinted in Press Release, FCC, FCC Approves Merger of AT&T and BellSouth
Corporation 8 (Dec. 29, 2006), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
269275Al.pdf. For a proposal to give the FCC "antitrust-like" authority to adjudicate
complaints about service providers abusing their market power, see generally ROBERT D.
ATKINSON & PFiLiP J. WEISER, A "THIRD WAY" ON NETwORK NEUTRALITY 2006 (Info. Tech.
& Innovation Found.), available at http://www.itif.org/files/netneutrality.pdf.
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discriminate as well as what it would allow a provider to discriminate
against, e.g., traffic sources or destinations, applications, or protocols. We
define the trustworthiness exceptions classes as follows:
1. Narrow Exception. A network provider may not discriminate against
traffic, applications, or protocols to protect trustworthiness. As we read
bills that provide such an exception, a network provider would be
limited to offering trust-related services, such as spain filtering or virus
protection, so long as individual users may opt out of them.
2. Medium Exception. A network provider may discriminate against
content, applications, or protocols to protect the trustworthiness of the
network, but it may not take into account any affiliation (or lack thereof)
with a content, application, or protocol provider when deciding whether
to discriminate.
3. Broad Exception. A network provider may discriminate against content,
applications, or protocols, so long as it does so to protect the
trustworthiness of the network.
The Narrow Exception comes from a bill in the current Congress
introduced by Senators Byron Dorgan and Olympia Snowe.38 Specifically,
the Dorgan-Snowe bill creates an exception for "protecting the security of a
user's computer on the network of such broadband service provider, or
managing such network in a manner that does not distinguish based on the
source or ownership of content, application or service., 39 The assumption
38. Similar exceptions appear in state-level legislation in New York and Maine. The
New York State Assembly is considering a network neutrality resolution, which provides
this security exception:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a broadband or Internet
network provider from taking reasonable and nondiscriminatory measures... to
manage the functioning of its network to protect the security and to offer parental
controls and other consumer protection measures of such network and broadband
or Internet network services if such management does not result in discrimination
among the content, applications, or services on the network.
A.B. 3980 § 243(2)(A), 231st Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007). Similarly, a bill introduced in the
Maine legislature would have mandated "nondiscriminatory access" but permitted a service
provider to "[p]rotect the security of a user's computer or provide services in a manner that
does not distinguish the source of ownership of content, application or service." See L.D.
1675(3)(A), 123d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2007).
39. See Internet Freedom Preservation Act, S. 215, 110th Cong. § 12(b)(1) (2007)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Dorgan-Snowe Bill]. The predecessor to this bill contained an
identical exception. See S. 2917, 109th Cong. (2006). Along similar lines, the Internet
Freedom and Nondiscrimination Act of 2006, H.R. 5417, 109th Cong. (2006), would have
allowed prioritization of certain types of data, so long as broadband service providers treated
all providers of such data equally. This bill did not explicitly mention security. Instead, it
contained a number of exceptions that might encompass network security. For example, §
3(c)(1) would have allowed a service provider "to manage the functioning of its network, on
a systemwide basis, provided that any such management function does not result in
discrimination"; and § 3(c)(4) explicitly allows a provider to "offer consumer protection
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in the Narrow Exception is that network providers can only deploy
defenses that protect "their" networks alone and may do so only provided
that deploying the defenses does not degrade connectivity based on the
source of content or the application or service in use.
The Medium Exception derives from the Network Neutrality Act of
2006, introduced by Congressman Ed Markey.40 The text of the Markey
Bill's trustworthiness exception support reading it more broadly-as stated
in the definition of the Medium Exception above-than the Narrow
Exception. Though the security exception in the Markey Bill would require
providers to use "reasonable and nondiscriminatory measures" to protect
security,4' the overall structure of the bill suggests that not all forms of
discrimination are prohibited. Specifically, the line between permissible
and impermissible discrimination appears to be whether a service provider
takes into account the distinction between content or services that it (or an
affiliate) provides versus an unaffiliated provider: a network operator may
"manage the functioning of its network, on a system-wide basis, provided
that any such management function does not result in discrimination
between content, applications, or services offered by the provider and
unaffiliated providers."42 Finally, like the Narrow Exception, the Medium
Exception allows a network operator to offer "consumer protection
services" that might include trustworthiness guarantees, so long as
subscribers may opt out of them.43
Finally, the Broad Exception removes any nondiscrimination
requirement, though the single-firm view of network security remained in
place. The Internet Consumer Bill of Rights Act, introduced by Senator
Ted Stevens, would have provided such an exception by allowing a
network operator to "protect the security, privacy, or integrity of the
network or facilities of such provider, the computer of any subscriber, or
any service, including by-(A) blocking worms or viruses; or (B)
preventing denial of service attacks."" Note that the Broad Exception, as
written in the Stevens Bill, does not qualify a network operator's right to
discriminate with any consideration of affiliation between the provider and
the target of discrimination.
services (such as parental controls), provided that a user may refuse or disable such
services." Id.
40. Network Neutrality Act of 2006, H.R. 5273, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter
Markey Bill]. Congressman Markey recently introduced a substantially revised bill, the
Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2008, H.R. 5353, 110th Cong. (2008).
41. Markey Bill, H.R. 5273, § 4(b)(3).
42. Id. § 4(b)(1) (emphasis added).
43. Id. § 4(b)(4).
44. This Act was Title IX of the Communications Opportunity, Promotion, and
Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5252, 109th Cong. § 906 (2006).
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Despite differences on the issue of discrimination for the purposes of
improving network trustworthiness, trustworthiness exceptions (as well as
the four Internet Freedoms 45) share a common approach with the increasing
need for coordination among service providers: they ignore it. All of these
proposals reflect a single-firm outlook on trustworthiness-service
providers may decide when to act in the interests of securing the subnets
they operate (or their subscribers' computers), albeit with varying levels of
immunity from the broader nondiscrimination requirements. Whether this
silence precludes providers from coordinating on matters of
trustworthiness, or on what may be considered sensible guidelines for
determining whether a provider's actions are sufficiently protective of its
subnet in the case of coordinated defenses, these are questions we do not
settle here.46 Still, this silence is worth noting, given the importance that
coordinated defenses will play in improving network trustworthiness.47
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF TRUSTWORTHINESS EXCEPTIONS IN
NETWORK NEUTRALITY RULES
In this Part, we consider whether proposals to enhance network
trustworthiness would be permissible under the three classes of
trustworthiness exceptions introduced above. Two questions guide our
analysis of the relationship between each exception and network neutrality:
1. What trustworthiness improvements are available without
discriminating against traffic based on its source?
2. What is left of network neutrality's general nondiscrimination
principle if network operators may discriminate against
communications sources, applications, or services in order to
enhance network trustworthiness?
45. See Powell, supra note 28.
46. Whatever these boundaries may be, the antitrust laws would provide some limit on
the kinds of information that providers may share, as well as the purposes for which they
may share it. Specifically, Section 1 of the Sherman Act, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
1 (2000), prohibits agreements that unreasonably restrain trade; and sharing information
about industry practices may sometimes run afoul of this law. See Complaint, United States
v. Prof'I Consultants Ins. Co., Civil No. 1:05CV01272 (D.D.C. June 24, 2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f209700/209728.pdf (alleging that actuarial consulting firms
moved toward an industry standard of limitations on liability clauses by sharing
competitively sensitive information about such clauses and their efforts to implement them
independently).
Note that, in the past, concerns about potential Section 1 liability for sharing
security-related information have prompted Congress to propose an antitrust exception for
sharing such information. See Cyber Security Information Act of 2000, H.R. 4246, 106th
Cong.; see also Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., Davis-Moran Cyber Security Information
Act-H.R. 4246 (May 5, 2000), http://www.cdt.org/security/000504davismoran.shtml
(criticizing the antitrust exemption as "unnecessary").
47. See our discussion of this point in the Introduction to this Article, supra p. 592.
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Our discussion answers these questions in the context of three
guarantees that would help to improve network trustworthiness. These
three guarantees are by no means exhaustive, but they are sufficiently
diverse to illustrate trust-enhancing mechanisms that would be permissible
(or forbidden) under each trustworthiness exception. Part III.A examines a
trustworthiness guarantee that might require service providers to agree not
to exchange traffic. By contrast, the guarantee discussed in Part III.B would
require providers to relinquish their right not to exchange traffic with each
other. Finally, a provider acting unilaterally could implement the privacy
guarantee given in Part III.C effectively. Examining this range of
trustworthiness guarantees permits us to evaluate whether network
neutrality trustworthiness exceptions accommodate the range of defenses
available today and that appear to be promising for the near future.
A. Isolation from Unwanted Traffic
The Internet currently does not guarantee that a user will remain
isolated from-i.e., will not receive traffic from-a specific set of hosts.48
Yet, an isolation guarantee would be useful to defend against distributed
denial of service attacks. Blocking traffic from certain hosts could also
prevent the spread of viruses or worms from one host to another. Limiting
the spread of this malware, in turn, could interrupt the formation of
"botnets"--networks of compromised computers under the control of a
remote attacker-which can then be used to launch distributed denial of
service attacks, send spam, or store data that are useful in committing
financial crimes.
Current defenses against this malware are implemented
predominantly at the edge of the network. Firewalls, for example, block
traffic with specific characteristics, and anti-virus programs installed on
individual PCs reduce the end-user's risk of executing malicious software.
These defenses, though helpful, have significant limitations. Authors of
worms and viruses have become adept at crafting programs that evade
detection. Furthermore, firewalls are usually ineffective against denial of
service attacks because the attacks saturate network resources near the edge
of or on the target host--even if a firewall prevents traffic from reaching
the intended target, that host nevertheless remains unavailable if its link to
the Internet is saturated by attack traffic.
The questions of whether networks should support and will support
isolation guarantees are being debated by technologists and others who are
considering future Internet designs.49 Still, the basic contours are clear
48. See Clark, supra note 10, at 7-8.
49. See id. at 7.
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enough to discuss within the context of network access competition policy.
Basically, guaranteeing isolation would require automatic detection of
malicious traffic and the quarantine of infected hosts.50 Detecting malicious
traffic, in turn, might require service providers to exchange network data5
as well as agreements not to exchange traffic. This is because certain kinds
of attacks, such as distributed denial of service attacks, might be
perpetrated using traffic whose packet-level characteristics are
indistinguishable from legitimate traffic. Only when traffic observations
from many points on the network are correlated could a picture of an attack
emerge. 
52
1. Isolation as a Consumer Service
Suppose an ISP offers to its subscribers a package of trustworthiness
services relating to isolation (e.g., filtering traffic from botnets, worms, and
viruses), and blocking traffic believed to be part of a distributed denial of
service attack. Only under the Narrow Exception-which would not allow
blocking based on the source of network traffic-could this service be
prohibited. As noted above, successful identification of certain kinds of
attacks depends upon finding patterns in the source and timing of traffic;
without the ability to discriminate on the basis of network traffic source,
such mitigation would be ineffective. The Medium and Broad Exceptions,
which permit at least some discrimination based on source for network
security purposes, would allow network providers to engage in such
blocking or degradation.
Still, the Narrow Exception permits service providers to offer
"consumer protection services" so long as each user may refuse or disable
the service.53 This approach, however, would severely limit the
effectiveness of blocking virus (or worm, or botnet) related traffic. If any
single user refuses to accept the service, then the network provider might
have to handle all sorts of undesirable traffic, which itself does collateral
damage to other sites. For example, if a user opts out of her provider's
denial of service protection, then the provider would be obligated to deliver
any denial of service attacks that have been launched against her site. But,
50. See id.
51. See, e.g., YINGLIAN XIE ET AL., CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., FORENSIC ANALYSIS FOR
EPIDEMIC ATTACKs IN FEDERATED NETWORKS (2006), available at http'//www.ieee-
icnp.org/2006/papers/s2al .pdf.
52. See id. at 43; MARK ALLMAN ET AL., PURDUE UNIV. INT'L COMPUTER SCI. INST.,
FIGHTING COORDINATED ATTACKERS WITH CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION
SHARING § 1, (2006), available at http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/info-sharing-hotnet
06.pdf.
53. See Dorgan-Snowe Bill, .S. 215, 110th Cong. § 12(b)(3) (2007). We discuss the
difficulties in this approach later in this Part.
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when a denial of service attack occurs, the attack traffic makes the network
unusable by other sites that share a network with this recalcitrant user,
because the denial of service traffic destined to her site is also clogging the
pipes these other sites use.
2. Isolation as Provider Policy
Two widely repeated observations about computer and network
security might make an isolation service inadequate. The first observation
is that end-users are reluctant to invest much in improving security. The
second observation-as the example of denial of service attacks
illustrates-is that the insecurity of one host on a network can harm end-
users at another host. These observations are related: end-users do not fully
internalize the benefits of their investment in security and, conversely, any
given user may be victimized by attacks launched from the "weakest link"
in the network. A possible response from network providers is to block
suspected worm, virus, and botnet traffic for all subscribers. That is,
instead of offering isolation guarantees as a separate service, the service
provider imposes them by default.54 The Medium and Broad Exceptions,
however, would allow this approach.
54. It is difficult to predict which course network providers would take. On the one
hand, ISPs are developing managed security services aimed primarily at large enterprise
customers; thus, at least some service providers see managed security services as a potential
new source of revenue. See Sarah D. Scalet, Pipe Cleaners. Telcos Offer Managed Security
Services, CSOONLINE.COM (July 12, 2007), http://www.csoonline.com/article/221260/Pipe_
CleanersTelcosOfferManaged SecurityServices (noting that "[f]or now, and maybe for
the long run, companies like AT&T will have to continue to make careful decisions about
what traffic they can safely delete without violating their service-level agreements with
customers or overstepping their bounds as common carriers that just pass bits from left to
right").
On the other hand, at least some network operators have taken aggressive, blanket
action to block traffic. Once discovered by users, such measures are not popular. For
example, in October 2007, Comcast began blocking (or, in Comcast's terms, "delaying")
traffic associated with the peer-to-peer file sharing program BitTorrent. See FCC to Look at
Complaints Comcast Interferes with Net, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2O08/01/09/business/media/O9fcc.html. Comcast defended the
practice as "reasonable network management." Ryan Paul, FCC to Investigate Comcast
BitTorrent Blocking, ARs TECHNICA, Jan. 8, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2008/01/fcc-to-investigate-comcast-bittorrent-blocking.ars.
Public outcry ensued after the blocking was discovered, the FCC opened an
investigation, and consumer groups filed a complaint with the FCC. The relationship
between Comcast's justification-"network management"-and trustworthiness is unclear,
and it is also unclear whether Comcast blocked BitTorrent to defend against a threat to
trustworthiness. Still, this example serves to illustrate that network operators face a
potentially difficult choice between applying blanket policies, which hold promise in
providing trustworthiness guarantees but could provoke user backlash, and making such
blocking part of a strictly optional service.
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An alternative approach is for multiple network providers to federate
and exchange data about possible attacks. 5" The rationale for this federation
is that smaller service providers administer smaller slices of the Internet's
address space; unlike backbone providers or large ISPs, these providers
might not command a sufficiently wide view of the Internet to identify
subtle threats.5 6 A last-mile ISP might also agree to share information with
a backbone provider. The backbone provider, which handles a higher
volume of traffic and is likely to have a more comprehensive view of
Internet traffic than a last-mile ISP, would be able to provide the ISP with a
broader view than the ISP could obtain on its own. Finally, two or more
backbone providers might agree to exchange information about malicious
traffic in order to provide their respective downstream customers-last-
mile ISPs or large enterprise networks-with guarantees that malicious
traffic will be suppressed.
Neither coordination among last-mile ISPs nor coordination between
an ISP and one or more backbone providers is addressed in network
neutrality security exceptions or in the network neutrality debate more
generally. Network neutrality security exceptions are silent about the
prospect of coordination among network access providers to implement
isolation guarantees. As was the case with vertically integrated
operations-whether performed as a service that a subscriber requests, or
as a default policy of the service provider-the key, from an
implementation perspective, is being able to block traffic based on source.
3. Isolation Under the Broad Exception
A final consideration raised by the examples presented here is
whether the Broad Exception, which would allow a network operator to
discriminate arbitrarily in response to a trustworthiness threat, could
swallow a network neutrality rule.
Attackers have methods to remotely install malicious software that
evades both firewalls and anti-virus software. For example, users risk
unwittingly downloading malicious software simply by viewing Web pages
that have been corrupted by attackers.57 These threats pervade the Internet;
accordingly, a service provider might be able to find justification for
55. For a discussion of how this might work in practice, see XIE ET AL., supra note 51.
56. See Scalet, supra note 54 (quoting Gartner Vice President John Pescatore: "[I]t's
not just economies of scale . . . . It's that the carriers have access to information that the
individual enterprise doesn't").
57. See NIELS PROVOS ET AL., GOOGLE, INC., THE GHOST IN THE BROWSER:
ANALYSIS OF WEB-BASED MALWARE (2007), http://www.usenix.org/events/hotbots07/tech/
full_papers/provos/provos.pdf (demonstrating how malicious HTML and JavaScript can be
used to cause a browser to download malicious software automatically to an end-user's
computer-a so-called "drive-by download").
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degrading the performance of an application or to degrade or block
connections to specific hosts on the Internet. In the absence of any
nondiscrimination obligation, the provider would be free to block sites or
degrade applications of non-affiliated providers, even if its affiliates'
offerings were equally risky. Thus, the Broad Exception might shelter
provider conduct that is only incidentally related to Internet trustworthiness
and possibly motivated by reasons not related to any aspect of
trustworthiness.
The Medium Exception avoids this. A network operator
discriminating against certain content, applications, or protocols for
(ostensibly) trust-related reasons, while leaving the services of affiliated
providers undisturbed, might support an inference that the network
provider has taken affiliations into account. As a result, the discrimination
would not be protected by the exception; instead, it would violate the
network neutrality rule.
B. Availability and Integrity: Attribution of Path
Internet packet routing is currently beyond individual users' control.
Once Internet communications leave a sender's last-mile ISP's network,
they are carried by backbone providers until they arrive at the receiver's
ISP. 58 These backbone providers exchange traffic under barter agreements
in an unregulated market. As others have noted, peering agreements are
responsible for various problems, including sub-optimal routing and a lack
of investment in innovations to the Internet's core. 59 Indifference to the
route between a sender and a receiver makes connections between end
points resilient to failures of some subnets (by giving service providers
license to update routes as needed), but it requires users to trust the routing
infrastructure for the entire Internet. Two examples will illustrate that
58. See DAVID D. CLARK, ET AL., TUSSLE IN CYBERSPACE: DEFINING TOMORROW'S
INTERNET § 3.1.4 (2002), available at http://portal.acm.org/citation.cffm?id=
633059 (follow "PDF" link); FED. TRADE COMM'N, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY
COMPETITION POLICY 25-26 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
broadband/v070000report.pdf; RAMESH JOHARI & JOHN TsITSIKLIS, ROUTING AND
PEERING IN A COMPETITIVE INTERNET 1-2 (2003), available at http://web.mit.edu/
jnt/www/Papers/P-03-joh-peering-pre.pdf; PAUL LASKOWSKI & JOHN CHUANG, NETWORK
MONITORS AND CONTRACTING SYSTEMS: COMPETITION AND INNOVATION 183 (2006),
available at http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfin?doid=1 159913.1159935 (follow "PDF"
hyperlink); SYLVIA RATNASAMY, SCOTT SHENKER & STEVEN MCCANNE, TOWARDS AN
EVOLVABLE INTERNET ARCHITECTURE 313, 315 (2005), available at
http://conferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/200S/paper-RatShe.pdf.
59. See JOHARI & TSITSIKLIS, supra note 58, at 2, 3 (discussing "hot potato" routing
under backbone provider peering agreements); LASKOWSKI & CHUANG, supra note 58, at
183-85 (analyzing how peering agreements diminish incentives to invest in core Internet
innovation).
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routing control by users would provide useful guarantees for improving
network trustworthiness.
First, consider a user who trusts routers only in certain countries. For
instance, this user might be a defense industry consultant who is traveling
abroad and needs to communicate confidentially with her colleagues in the
United States. But she surmises that her communications are likely to pass
through countries that monitor the contents of Internet communications and
would be highly motivated to try to break the encryption on
communications relating to the U.S. defense industry.6° If this user can
control the routes that her communications take, she will be able to ensure
that those communications travel only through countries whose routers she
trusts; she would no longer have to trust the entire Internet.
A second example is a guarantee of disjoint paths, i.e., paths that do
not rely on any of the same routers. The use of such paths increases the
probability of delivering any given packet because the probability of failure
(or compromise) of a machine on any given path is independent of the
other paths.6 '
Providing stronger routing guarantees-whether a guarantee to follow
a route specified by an end-user or a service provider's guarantee of diverse
routing-requires coordination among network access providers.
Specifically, to implement these guarantees, network providers would have
to (1) implement a technical mechanism to express and communicate
preferred routes, (2) agree to follow route specifications, and (3) provide
some means for others to verify that a given provider had followed its
promise to route traffic in the specific manner.62
We set aside the considerable change in economic relationships
among last-mile and backbone providers that would be necessary to
achieve such guarantees in order to examine how they would be evaluated
under a trustworthiness exception to network neutrality. In both examples
we presented, end-users sought guarantees concerning the paths their
communications would take. The network provider did not draw
distinctions among the end-points to which these users wanted to connect.
In other words, a network provider's ability to offer attributions of path
60. Information about the likely route of an Internet communication can be obtained by
using the traceroute command on Unix and Mac systems, or the tracert command
on a Microsoft Windows system.
61. An alternative to full user control over the routes for their communications is
simply to provide guarantees of diverse routing. The current Internet architecture does not
support these guarantees, either.
62. For a proposal for how to implement these requirements in practice, see KARTHIK
LAKSHMINARAYANAN ET AL., ACHIEVING CONVERGENCE-FREE ROUTING USING
FAILURE-CARRYING PACKETS (2007), http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/-mccaesar/papers/
fcp.pdf.
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does not necessarily imply that the provider would use control over routing
to degrade performance based on the end-user's choice of application or the
identity of the other party to the communication. So long as the end-user
controls this choice, these guarantees would fall within the scope of even
the Narrow Exception.
A more difficult question arises if a network provider were to select
routes based on its own security considerations. As a practical matter, a
network architecture that provided routing guarantees could allow
providers to discriminate against traffic based on its source or the
application in use. A provider might decide, for example, that a particular
Web browser leaves its users unacceptably vulnerable to the installation of
malicious software by remote attackers. This vulnerability, the network
provider might conclude, threatens the security of the network by opening
it to further propagation of malicious software, or by enlisting it in
distributed denial of service attacks.63 Suppose that the provider further
reasons that alternatives to this browser with the same functionality are
available at no cost. A network architecture that supports path attribution
would allow the provider to choose relatively slow routes for requests from
that browser, thus degrading the service based on the application that the
subscriber has chosen.
In this case, the service provider would likely run afoul of the Narrow
Exception. The service provider has clearly decided in this example to
degrade the performance of a particular application, something that the
Narrow Security Exception flatly prohibits. 64
The Broad Exception, however, probably offers some cover for the
service provider's decision to degrade the performance of the browser in
question through route manipulation. The network provider in this example
acted to preempt remote threats to the security of subscribers' computers by
penalizing users who used a relatively vulnerable browser. This exception
would allow a provider to block traffic from worms or viruses, or to
63. We are aware that an ISP may have incentives to be disingenuous, using
trustworthiness as a pretext to degrade service when the primary motivation may be a
financial agreement with the provider of another, similar service. Indeed, the existence of
such an agreement would create some suspicion about the service provider's motives. To
keep this example simple, however, we assume that the service provider acts solely to
impose a penalty for using a highly vulnerable browser. We have much more to say about
trustworthiness as a pretext for discrimination in Part [V.A.
64. See Dorgan-Snowe Bill, S. 215, 110th Cong. § 12(b)(l) (2007) (requiring a service
provider to manage security in a manner that "does not distinguish based on the source or
ownership of content, application, or service") (emphasis added); Markey Bill, H.R. 5273,
109th Cong. § 4(b)(3) (2006) (requiring a provider to protect of the security of its network
or a subscriber's computer using "reasonable and nondiscriminatory" measures) (emphasis
added).
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"prevent[] denial of service attacks." 65 There is no requirement that the
service provider act only to prevent or counter a denial of service attack
once it is underway; a set of logically connected considerations-
discouraging vulnerable browser use by degrading its performance might
prevent malicious software installation, and thus prevent the use of such
software to carry out denial of service attacks-might suffice to bring the
provider's conduct within the scope of the Broad Exception. In addition,
this security exception would allow a provider to prevent "unauthorized"
uses of its network, without any restrictions on the means employed to
achieve that goal.66
To see the full implications of the Broad Exception, consider a slight
change to our example. Suppose that alternative browsers have the same
type of security vulnerability as the browser against which the provider
discriminates. Because complex network applications, such as Web
browsers, are almost certain to have at least some security vulnerabilities,
network providers could cite network trustworthiness reasons to block or
degrade traffic going to specific browsers, even if the primary motivation
for such discrimination is to favor one or more browsers.
The Medium Exception would provide far less cover for using
trustworthiness to limit a network neutrality rule. By forbidding network
providers from considering their affiliation (or lack of affiliation) with
application, content, or service providers when deciding whether to engage
in trustworthiness-related discrimination, the Medium Exception would
require a provider to articulate some trustworthiness rationale for
discriminating against one browser while leaving others with similar
security vulnerabilities unaffected.67
In this regard, the Medium Exception essentially follows Carterfone's
trustworthiness rule, which allowed network providers to set standards for
network trustworthiness and ban devices that violate them, so long as the
provider treats similar devices similarly.68 If the network provider could
produce such a rationale, the Medium Exception would permit the
discrimination. Thus, the Medium Exception is flexible without allowing
65. See Communications Opportunity, Promotion, and Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R
5252, 109th Cong. § 906(1) (2006).
66. Id. § 906(3). Note that other provisions of H.R. 5252's security exception do not
limit this exception. Users would have the right to run any application "without interference
from an Internet service provider, except as otherwise provided by law" (emphasis added).
Id. §§ 903(a)(7), (b)(2).
67. Determining whether the overall security of two applications is similar is not, in
general, an easy task; the disciplines of computer and network security are dogged by the
difficulty of devising metrics to measure security. See COMM. ON IMPROVING
CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 12, at 168.
68. See the discussion of Carterfone, supra Part II.B.
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any claim of enhanced trustworthiness to protect discrimination from a
network neutrality rule.
A potential objection to the Medium Exception is that it does not
require the network operator to tailor its discrimination as narrowly as
possible to address a given threat to trustworthiness. For instance, in the
context of our browser example, the Medium Exception might allow a
network provider to require the use of a specific browser-a highly
restrictive form of discrimination that could make it difficult for new
applications to find users-when it would suffice to degrade or to outright
ban browsers that did not meet the provider's security requirements.
Two considerations remove some of the force of this objection. First,
actual legislation, such as the Markey Bill, which provided the impetus for
our definition of the Medium Exception, could limit network providers to
reasonably discriminatory measures. It is beyond the scope of this Article
to suggest a standard for reasonableness, but it might include whether a
network provider could have chosen less-sweeping measures for achieving
the same trustworthiness objective. Second, as we discuss in Part IV, any
trustworthiness exception to network neutrality should require network
providers to justify the exception by disclosing relevant details about their
use of discrimination. This disclosure requirement would allow users and
regulators to monitor discrimination, which might, in turn, lead providers to
choose narrow defenses.
C. Privacy and Confidentiality: Guarantees Against Logging
The conditions of network access-and the role of trustworthiness as
a limitation on network neutrality obligations--encompass more than
whether service providers degrade or block communications involving
certain hosts or applications. To take one example, service providers play
an essential role in setting guarantees of Communications Privacy.69 In
contrast to the trustworthiness guarantees discussed above, which
individual service providers have relatively limited power to make,
providers exert significant control over Communications Privacy
guarantees. Competition among service providers shows promise to
strengthen Communications Privacy guarantees, yet this dimension of
competition is one that the network access policy debate has largely
69. As stated infra Part HI.A, Communications Privacy pertains to preventing third
parties from learning of the existence of traffic to or from a party. This is but one element of
privacy. It is nevertheless an appropriate focus for a discussion on the intersection between
trustworthiness and network competition policy.
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ignored.70 This Section expands the framework of network access
competition to include end-user Communications Privacy.
Communications Privacy fits naturally into the framework that we
have established for relating network trustworthiness to network access
competition. First, Communications Privacy protection affects end-users'
decisions about Internet use. For example, a user who is concerned about
breaches of Communications Privacy might avoid visiting certain websites
out of fear that her use will be revealed (or used in public or private
surveillance). 71 Thus, Communications Privacy guarantees could help to
promote the goal of openness on the Internet that network neutrality
advocates seek. As the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board
of the National Research Council wrote in a recent report that makes
"confidentiality of stored information and information exchange" part of a
"Cybersecurity Bill of Rights":
One central function of information technology is the communication
and storage of information. Just as most people engage in telephone
conversations and store paper files with some reasonable assurance that
the content will remain private even without their taking explicit
action, users should expect electronic systems to communicate and
store information in accordance with clear confidentiality policies and
with reasonable and comprehensible default behavior . . . . As a
particularly important way of ensuring confidentiality, responsible
parties should have the technical capability to delete or expunge
selected information that should not be permanently stored.72
A second reason to view Communications Privacy as standing on
equal footing with availability and integrity guarantees is that individual
users-and technical approaches that focus on the edge of the network-
are limited in what they can do to support Communications Privacy.
Anonymizers provide some measure of Communications Privacy by
making traffic analysis more difficult, but these technical measures can be
cumbersome to use and do not address logging by ISPs. 73 Thus, like the
isolation and path attribution guarantees discussed earlier, Communications
70. There is some evidence to support the assertion that competition leads to increased
individual information privacy. This has been most extensively explored in the context of
search engines. A recent report from the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) finds,
for example, that "search engines are now competing to provide the best privacy
protections." CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., SEARCH PRIVACY PRACTICES: A WORK IN
PROGRESS 1 (2007), available at http://www.cdt.org/privacy/20070808searchprivacy.pdf.
71. See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 121
(2004) (discussing how end-users' online activities are recorded, stored, and analyzed into
individual profiles for commercial use).
72. COMM. ON IMPROVING CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 12, at 54.
73. See, e.g., Tor: Anonymity Online, http://tor.eff.org/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2009). Tor
uses a distributed network of servers to route communications in a manner that makes them
resistant to traffic analysis by parties with access to network traffic logs.
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Privacy guarantees could provide a basis for network service provider
differentiation and competition in the near term and impetus for technical
improvements in the longer term. In other words, technical and policy
decisions about Communications Privacy will be made alongside decisions
that affect other elements of trustworthiness as well as the Internet's
support for innovation and openness.
The current Internet architecture does not provide technical
guarantees to protect individual Communications Privacy. Last-mile ISPs,
backbone providers, and Internet hosts (such as e-commerce sites) set their
own network traffic logging policies. United States law does not require
network access providers to retain data, but, on the other hand, it does not
impose limits on the amount of data that these providers may retain. 4
Though details about data retention practices of specific network service
providers are scarce, some prominent providers retain significant amounts
of data about subscribers."
Thus, a straightforward and potentially far-reaching means of
compromising individual Communications Privacy on the Internet is for a
last-mile provider to link a user's personal identifying information to his or
her IP address and a list of addresses that subscriber visited. Whether a
provider makes this link voluntarily or under compulsion, 76 last-mile
providers occupy a central role in setting communications privacy
protections because they control subscriber information, monitor IP address
assignments, and may retain logs of subscribers' Internet use." Backbone
providers may log Internet communications records, but typically do not
have the information necessary to link these records to individuals.
Individual websites, on the other hand, may collect information about
74. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (1986), does establish a data preservation requirement; under specific circumstances, a
service provider must preserve data that it has in its possession, but the ECPA has no
provision to require retention prospectively. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f).
75. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24,
28 (D.D.C. 2003), remanded by 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Defendant's Memorandum
in Support of Motion to Quash Subpoena Served by Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am.,
Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Charter Comms., Inc., No. 4:03MC00273CEJ (E.D. Mo.,
Oct. 3, 2003) (notably, not arguing that Charter did not have the information necessary to
comply with the RIAA's subpoena for personal identifying information linked to an IP
address), available at http://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/20031003_memosupport mot.pdf.
76. One of the three titles in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)
regulates the circumstances under which a service provider may disclose such data
voluntarily as well as in response to subpoenas or other compulsory process. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2710.
77. Though the details of specific network access providers' data retention practices are
not publicly known, several sources of evidence suggest that they log considerable amounts
of information about their customers' Internet use. Last-mile providers have strong
incentives-protecting against fraud, abuse, and bandwidth hogs-to keep information that
will allow them to identify an IP address with a particular subscriber.
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individuals but typically do not control the same breadth and volume of
data that a last-mile provider does. Thus, Communications Privacy
guarantees from a last-mile provider, such as a policy limiting the scope
and duration of data retention, could significantly reduce threats to privacy,
though they would not eliminate them. The guarantee discussed here would
gain little strength from coordination among different providers; so, it lends
itself to unilateral implementation by a single provider.
Raising the profile of Communications Privacy guarantees as a
dimension of network provider competition would begin with seeking more
information about current practices. 78 This, in turn, would provide end-
users with sufficient information to discipline service providers in the
marketplace, either by registering complaints with their providers or
switching to a different one. Thus, improving Communications Privacy
guarantees could follow naturally from greater disclosure of service plan
information-which is a pillar of the current network neutrality regulatory
environment-provided that policymakers, market participants, and
advocates recognizing Communications Privacy as an element of
trustworthiness that competition could help to improve.79
D. Trustworthiness and Wireless Net Neutrality
A final test of trustworthiness as a limitation on network neutrality
obligations concerns wireless networks. The rapid increase in the number
of cell phones and other handheld devices that can access the Internet, as
well as the FCC's upcoming auction of "beachfront" spectrum, have
focused attention on whether wireless networks should be subject to
network neutrality principles. 80 A great deal remains unsettled in the FCC's
plans for wireless spectrum, 81 and we seek to remain agnostic about
whether network neutrality is desirable for wired networks. Therefore, we
do not take a position on wireless network neutrality, focusing instead on
78. Obtaining this information is likely to pose a significant challenge. See Posting of
Ryan Singel to Threat Level, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/03/whyispdata
su.html (Mar. 29, 2007, 13:26:52 EST) (discussing the difficulties involved in "ferret[ing]
out how ISPs store and share user Internet usage histories").
79. See Powell, supra note 28, at 11-12 (discussing the "Freedom to Obtain Service
Plan Information" as one of the four Internet Freedoms articulated by former FCC Chairman
Michael Powell).
80. For the final rules governing the auction, see Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-
762 and 777-792 MHz Bands, Second Report and Order, FCC 07-132, Aug. 10, 2007,
available at http:/ihraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-07-132AI.pdf. For a
brief overview of the auction, see Stephen Labaton, Airwaves, Web Power At Auction, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, at Cl.
81. See Shaheen Samavati, A New World of Wireless Is Just Around the Band,
CLEVELAND PLAIN-DEALER, Jan. 24, 2008, at CI (describing possible uses of the spectrum
being auctioned), available at http://blog.cleveland.com/business/2008/01/a-new-worldof
wireless networ.html.
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reasons to be cautious about extending network neutrality principles
without modification into the wireless context.
Wireless network operators, such as cellular phone carriers, have little
ability to contain devices that threaten the trustworthiness of the network.
Suppose, for example, that a cell phone has acquired software that causes it
to send a flood of traffic, such as text messages, to other cell phones. Since
one user's cell phone may interact with another before reaching provider-
controlled equipment, cell phones are at greater risk for being made
unavailable by their peers than are computers connected to the Internet by
cable modem or DSL. 82 In contrast to cell phones, cable and DSL modems
route all traffic through provider-controlled equipment, affording the
provider an opportunity to contain individual devices that harm the
availability of the provider's network.
A key question is whether differences between wired and wireless
architectures warrant enacting a relatively narrow network neutrality rule
for wireless networks. We would argue that differences in these
architectures permit different trustworthiness threats, and should be taken
into account when settling on a network neutrality rule. It may turn out,
after a full consideration of threats facing cell phones and other wireless
devices, that the class of attacks involving one cell phone harming
availability (or other trustworthiness properties) of another cell phone is
unimportant compared to, say, Internet-based attacks on cell phones.83 Still,
policymakers and other participants in the network neutrality debate should
not assume that all network architectures present identical considerations at
the intersection of neutrality and trustworthiness.
IV. KEEPING TRUSTWORTHINESS EXCEPTIONS LIMITED
THROUGH DISCLOSURE
Irrespective of the scope of a trustworthiness exception enacted as
part of a network neutrality rule, the question of how to enforce network
provider compliance with the exception remains. Of particular concern is
prevention of pretextual uses of the trustworthiness exception. In this Part,
we address the potential for a network provider to assert that it is
discriminating against traffic to protect network trustworthiness when, in
fact, the discrimination does little or nothing to achieve that goal.
We consider in Part IV.A three mechanisms to keep uses of a
trustworthiness exception in check: leaving trustworthiness mechanisms
82. Recent work has shown that a relatively small amount of text message traffic can
render cell phones unavailable for their intended uses. See WILLIAM ENCK ET AL., PA.
STATE UNIV., EXPLOITING OPEN FUNCTIONALITY IN SMS-CAPABLE CELLULAR
NETWORKS § 3 (2005), http://www.smsanalysis.org/smsanalysis.pdf.
83. Cell phones might be particularly susceptible to such attacks. See id. § 4. 1.
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unspecified and leaving enforcement entirely to ex post enforcement
actions by users or regulators, writing the trustworthiness exception to
specify all mechanisms permitted under the exception, and requiring
network providers to disclose details regarding their uses of the
trustworthiness exception. Of these, we conclude that the disclosure
approach seems best suited for this job. We then set forth some additional
considerations for trustworthiness-related disclosures in Part IV.B.
A. Mechanisms to Deter Trustworthiness-as-Pretext
The simplest approach to enforcing compliance with a trustworthiness
exception is to allow government enforcement agencies or end-users to sue
network providers over bogus uses of the exception but to refrain from
adding anything to the network neutrality rule that would aid enforcement.
Discrimination that does not fall within a trustworthiness exception (or
other statutory exception to the nondiscrimination obligation) is deemed
impermissible discrimination, and the conduct is subject to whatever
penalties the network neutrality rule provides.
Experience with network operator practices that have animated the
network neutrality debate give some support to this approach; several
instances of outright blocking have been discovered, brought to public
attention, and, for the most part, quickly reversed by the network
operator.84 Indeed, this is the approach taken by most of the legislation
reviewed in Part II.
There are two potential problems with this non-regulatory approach.
First, though some network neutrality violations will be readily apparent to
users, others might be more subtle. Relying on user vigilance does not
suffice. Second, leaving the trustworthiness exception without any structure
to support its application leaves network providers with a stark choice:
implement trustworthiness-enhancing discrimination in a way that a court
finds to fit the exception or face liability for violating the neutrality rule.
This choice might cause network operators to err on the side of avoiding
liability at the cost of trustworthiness. Conversely, users would also face a
binary choice if they discover that their network operator is discriminating
in an unacceptable fashion: sue (if private suits are allowed) or change
providers. To rely on the latter would assume that the market for network
access is competitive enough to allow user behavior to discipline network
operators' conduct. In other words, it would assume away the problem that
has motivated the network neutrality debate in the first place.
84. But see, Adam Liptak, Verizon Blocks Messages of Abortion Rights Group, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 27, 2007, at Al (discussing Verizon's reluctance to stop blocking controversial
text messages).
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A second approach to enforcing compliance would be to enumerate
all permissible instances of pro-trustworthiness discrimination. To provide
sufficient guidance, this enumeration would have to go beyond listing the
threats against which discrimination is permissible. It would have to
leave the means of addressing trustworthiness threats completely
unspecified, allowing network operators to choose draconian mechanisms
that have effects that go well beyond defending against specific threats.
Specifying not only which threats warrant departures from neutrality but
also how a network operator may defend against these threats would
address this problem. The approach, however, is likely to be extremely
costly-if not impossible-to develop and to be inflexible in practice. As
many of the examples in Part III illustrate, trustworthiness threats and
guarantees are evolving; even if it were possible to specify all of today's
threats and defenses, the taxonomy would quickly become outdated. And
unless the trustworthiness exception kept pace with defenses, a listing of
permissible defenses would fall behind.
Third, policymakers could add a disclosure requirement to the
trustworthiness exception, requiring network operators to report each
instance of a neutrality departure taken to protect network trustworthiness.
This approach avoids the rigidity of specifying ex ante all circumstances in
which discrimination is permissible. Instead, network operators decide for
themselves when a particular threat warrants discrimination. Disclosure
would allow either regulators or users to monitor use of a trustworthiness
exception, thus reducing the risk of abusing the exception to create a
market advantage. By having access to data from a wide variety of
providers, enforcers would be better able to judge which practices are
common in the industry and thus would be less likely to reflect one
provider's favoring a content source or application provider. This, in turn,
might lead to more nuanced assessments of provider conduct, reducing the
risk that the threat of litigation would chill deployment of new network
defenses.
To be effective, a disclosure requirement would need to be
accompanied by a penalty for a provider's failure to comply. Otherwise,
providers might determine that negative customer reaction or other risks
(discussed below) outweigh their obligation to report. Auditing network
operators' use of the exception by comparing an operator's internally
documented and publicly disclosed instances of discrimination could
provide a way to ensure compliance. These audits, however, would be
85. This was the approach taken in the Stevens Bill, which would allow network
operators to "block[] worms or viruses" and "prevent[] denial of service attacks."
Communications Opportunity, Promotion, and Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5252, 109th
Cong. § 906(1) (2006).
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invasive and potentially far more costly than the incidence of misreporting
warrants. A mechanism with lower costs would be to condition a network
provider's use of the trustworthiness exception as a defense to an alleged
neutrality violation upon disclosing the discrimination at issue. That is, a
provider could invoke the trustworthiness exception to defend
discrimination only if it had disclosed the instance(s) of discrimination
cited in an action brought under the network neutrality rule.
B. Striking the Right Balance for Trustworthiness Disclosures
Mandatory disclosures under the trustworthiness exception must
balance several considerations. First, there is a trade-off between providing
sufficient data to assess the merits of trustworthiness-related discrimination
on the one hand, and on the other, withholding data that would put a
network provider at a competitive disadvantage.
Second, disclosures could put the network operator at risk by
revealing details about its network configuration and defenses.
Third, there is a risk that disclosing information about discrimination
would reveal previously unknown vulnerabilities, leaving other providers'
networks at greater risk of attack.
Fourth, a disclosure could reveal information relevant to areas other
than trustworthiness, or to network neutrality for that matter. For example,
suppose network providers A and B exchange traffic under an
interconnection agreement that requires both providers to handle each
other's traffic at least as favorably as they handle traffic from other
providers. Suppose further that A discloses that it blocked botnet command
traffic originating in B's network. If B disputes A's conclusion, it might use
the information in A's disclosure-which B might not otherwise have
obtained-to sue A. In other words, the disclosure requirement might create
a thicket of competitiveness, security, and contractual headaches for
providers that are merely attempting to preserve their right to invoke the
trustworthiness defense.
Limiting disclosure to the agencies that have the authority to enforce
the network neutrality rule-most likely the FCC and the FTC86-would
mitigate the problems discussed above. Limited disclosure would allow, for
example, vendors of vulnerable products time to develop patches. It would
also leave parties wishing to bring action against a network provider, for a
network neutrality-related claim or otherwise, in the same position as they
would be in without the disclosure requirement. Keeping these reports
confidential would require either a specific exemption from the Freedom of
86. In a recent report, the FTC made the case for its competence and authority under
FTC Act § 5 to prosecute violations of network neutrality. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra
note 58, at 129-37.
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Information Act (FOIA) or successful application of FOIA's exemption of
trade secrets and confidential commercial information.87 An agency could
bolster the case for a FOIA exemption by promising the disclosing provider
an instance of discrimination confidentiality.88 This approach is in tension
with the overall thrust of network neutrality, which seeks to provide greater
transparency into network providers' practices. Agencies receiving
discrimination reports could reduce this tension by providing public reports
that de-identify the source of the information and remove information
about specific threats and defenses.89
A related question, whose answer may shed some light on the
appropriate recipient(s) for trustworthiness-related disclosures, is what
information constitutes an adequate disclosure. A wide range of attacks and
defenses might be the subject of disclosures, 90 making general guidelines
difficult to develop. Although that task is too technical for the present
Article, we do point out that the agencies likely to enforce network
neutrality-the FCC and the FTC-have the capacity to develop detailed
guidance, or even rules, to specify disclosure standards. 9' Both the FCC
and FTC regularly conduct rulemakings on highly complex, technical
topics. They also employ scientists capable of evaluating technical claims
that would arise in this context. Moreover, hearings or rulemakings would
allow public participation to help determine the kinds of data that network
providers should submit to enforcement agencies. Though these reports
might not be publicly available, this process would at least allow members
87. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
88. There is precedent for the FCC litigating FOIA requests for data of potentially
similar sensitivity. See, e.g., Center for Public Integrity v. FCC, Civ. Action No. 06-01644
(ESH) (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2007), https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_publicdoc?2006
cv1644-45 (holding that detailed data from network providers regarding broadband
connections in particular geographic areas are exempt from disclosure by the FCC under 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)-(b)(6)).
89. Determining exactly what information to put into a public report might be subtle.
The problem of de-identifying data, for example, does not have any general solutions; and
several high-profile cases had data re-indentified after release. See Schneier on Security,
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/12/anonymityandt_2.html (Dec. 18, 2007
05:53 EST) (commenting on a paper that reported an algorithm that could uniquely identify
99% of anonymized Netflix movie reviews from eight such reviews and other publicly
available data); see also Saul Hansell, AOL Removes Search Data on Vast Group of Web
Users, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 2006, at C4 (discussing fallout from AOL's release of (weakly)
re-identified search query histories of several hundred thousand users, which reporters and
others promptly re-idendtified).
90. See discussion supra Part III.
91. See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Magnificence of the
Disaster: Reconstructing the Sony BMG Rootkit Incident, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157,
1224-31 (2007) (arguing that the FTC is a "natural place" to undertake the technically
complex work of setting computer security-related policy); Pamela Samuelson & Jason
Schultz, Should Copyright Owners Have to Give Notice of Their Use of Technical
Protection Measures?, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 41, 69-70 (2007).
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of the public to ensure that regulators are receiving data helpfil in
assessing network providers' deviations from network neutrality to protect
network trustworthiness.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article offers a few conclusions that, we hope, can advance the
debate regarding network neutrality and network trustworthiness. Cyber
threats are an increasingly urgent matter for network operators and end-
users. A trustworthiness exception that does not allow a provider to
discriminate based on the source of Internet communications is unlikely to
give service providers sufficient latitude to respond to modern-day threats.
And, even if a trustworthiness exception allows service providers to offer
security services based on discriminating against traffic sources or
applications separately from basic Internet service, such a provision might
leave providers incapable of protecting users from the "public detriments"
that have set limits on the extent of network openness ever since Hush-a-
Phone was decided.
Still, a trustworthiness exception that does not impose any limits on
discrimination could swallow the neutrality rule. The threats that currently
face the Internet are far more varied and complex than those facing the
telephone system in Hush-a-Phone and Carterfone, but we argued in
Part III that the broad exception would allow at least some spurious claims
of protecting security to serve as cover for practices that have, at most, a
tenuous connection to network trustworthiness. To the extent that
policymakers are concerned about service providers using a trustworthiness
exception to evade a neutrality obligation, they should consider the
reporting requirements discussed in Part IV.
We have also identified the possibility that information sharing
among providers to improve network trustworthiness could threaten
competition that the network neutrality debate has thus far ignored.
Determining whether these agreements could affect competition among
network providers is an important area for future work, and it will require
combining the findings of technical research with a more detailed empirical
picture of the economic relationships among network providers and
economic and legal theories for evaluating competition under these
conditions.
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